places in the making of scientific knowledge.1 In this approach, the key to the nature of science as a body or system of knowledge lies not in individual genius or unique discovery, but in how networks of scientists routinely do science?literally, in their traditions of "savoir-faire.''2 Thus, the subject of study often is the analysis of ordinary scientists going about their everyday work just as much as stories of the great figures of Galileo, Darwin, or Einstein.3 In an essay of 1994, David Hollinger roots a trend toward discussions of scien tific communities and scientific practices in the anti-Soviet and anti-centralization concerns of intellectuals during the 1940s and 1950s.4 In the United States, these intellectuals included the scientists Vannevar Bush, James Bryant Conant, and
Warren Weaver, and the sociologists Robert Merton and Edward Shils. For them, the self-governing autonomy of the scientific community, traced by Merton to the Royal Society of London and 17th-century England, was crucial historically for the advancement of scientific knowledge.
These postwar intellectuals also argued that the scientific community itself can serve as an exemplary model of organization for a free and democratic society. and culture (Chicago, 1992) and Jed Z. Buchwald, ed. Scientific practice: Theories and stories of doing physics (Chicago, 1995) . Also, Stephen Turner, The social theory of practice: Tradition, tacit knowledge and presupposition (Chicago, 1994) . For an excellent summary and critique, see Terry Shinn and Pascal Ragouet, Controverses sur la science:
Pour une sociologie transversaliste de I'activite (Paris, 2005 745; and Sibum, "Reworking the mechanical value of heat: Instruments of precision and gestures of accuracy in early Victorian England," Studies in history and philosophy of science, 26 (1995) , 73-106. 3 . Steven Shapin and Arnold Thackray, "Prosopography as a research tool in history of science: The British scientific community, 1700 -1900 ," History of science, 12 (1974 , method in explaining the successes of science. Their views, according to recent historiography of science, were incorporated into the work of Thomas Kuhn, whose Structure of scientific revolutions (1962) , with its emphasis upon normal science and dominant paradigms, fostered new approaches for studying the history of science through the lenses of institutions, disciplines, communities, and practices.5 There is considerably more to be said, however, by way of explanation of a transition in emphasis within the history of science from scientific method to sci entific practice. This shift can be seated with equal plausibility in scientists' own changing perceptions of the nature of their science in the beginning decades of the 20th century. One scientist who experienced this transformation of perception was the Polish bacteriologist Ludwig Reck, whose Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935) was rediscovered by Kuhn and other in tellectuals in the 1950s.6 This essay concentrates on the physical chemist Michael
Polanyi , who independently was arguing by the early 1940s that it is the socially organized community of scientists, not isolated men and women of genius, that constitutes the essence of scientific inquiry. In essays and books, including Science, faith and society (1946) and Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy (1958) , Polanyi offered a detailed analysis of science as social practice and of the centrality of systems of authority, apprenticeship, and tacit knowledge in the disciplinary structure of the scientific community.7 Polanyi joined philosophers, like Karl Popper and sociologists like Merton, in popularizing the view that the explanation for the historical success of science lies not in empiricism, positivism, and logical method of explanation, but in the internal organization of science and its tightly codified practices. As with Popper and Merton, some of Polanyi's motivations in his writings on the nature of science were political. However, unlike Popper, Merton, and most other philosophers, so ciologists, and historians of science in the mid-20th century, Polanyi's views also were rooted in a distinguished scientific career that extended well over 25 years.
The German milieu that formed Polanyi's interpretation of science is the subject of Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach's groundbreaking study 5. Hollinger (ref. 4), [112] [113] [114] [168] [169] [170] [171] [172] ; Jan Golinski, Making natural knowledge: Constructivism and the history of science (Cambridge, 1998) During most of the 18th and early 19th centuries, physicists and chemists had used their own private funds to set up laboratories that they used for teaching and research. Increasingly, universities accepted funds from wealthy patrons and local industrial groups for the endowment or initial funding of laboratories and research institutes, transforming the appearance and structures of universities by the early 20th century, at the same time that student enrollments and the numbers of faculty positions expanded dramatically. Science was becoming a larger and larger enterprise. Much has been written about these developments in the history and sociology of science and education.14 In the field of chemistry, for example, Germany by 1900 was far ahead of other countries in the numbers of chemists educated in the universities and in university-level Technische Hochschulen and other institutions; in the numbers of papers they produced; and in the paid posi tions they held in industrial companies. , 1850 , -1970 , (London, 1972 , Colin Divall, "Education for design and production: Professional organization, employers, and the study of chemical engineering in British universities, 1922 -1976 ," Technology and culture, 35 (1994 In the In preparation for leaving Hungary, Polanyi re-registered his earlier change of name from Pollacsek to Polanyi, and he chose Austrian rather than Hungarian Polanyi's first assignment in Berlin was to head a research group to develop x ray diffraction studies of natural fibers and metals that were of interest to industry.38 A paper proposing that cellulose might have the structure of a huge molecule, later called a macromolecule, was met with skepticism from organic and colloidal chemists, and Polanyi temporarily abandoned the problem.39 More successfully, he began to see the possibility of exploiting the analogy between the diffraction patterns for cellulose fibers and metals under stress, thereby moving into the field that would become known as solid-state and materials science.
In 1923 Some 150 scientific co-workers and a total of 2,000 employees worked in the Berlin suburb of Dahlem on the production of nitric acid for explosives and fertilizers, as well as the preparation of poison gases.44 Describing the current relationship between German industrial firms and academic chemists, Haber told Crowther in 1930 that "there [is] no split between the scientific and commercial side," that in this develop ment chemistry had led the way and was followed by metallurgy and other fields45
The Prussian government provided the land on which Haber's institute was built and also Haber's salary and a portion of operating expenses. Leopold Koppel, owner of a Berlin bank, the Auer Gaslight Company (Auer Gasgluhlicht Gesellschaft), and other enterprises, donated an endowment which included 700,000 marks for the initial building and equipment of the Institute for Physical Chemistry followed by a 10-year budget of 35,000 marks annually.46 While the precise means of funding changed during the ensuing years of war and inflation, with Haber contributing his own patent royalties for a time,47 funding was always a mix of state, private, and industrial monies, including money in support of military interests.48 After the postwar devaluation of the mark, Koppel agreed to support Haber's Institute with 15,000 gold marks annually, but Haber also had to turn to both the national and the Oxford" in the quiet suburb of Berlin for scientists who would be independent of "clique and wealth."65 Unlike Oxford, the scientists generally were quite free of students and exams, although they often had appointments at the University or [Here in Berlin] the professors grab with great enthusiasm the hands of students who are thought to be gifted. They are like art collectors whose main passion is to discover talent_They educated me, they placed me where I can do my utmost.
They provide me with everything and do not ask for anything. They trust that the man who is aware of the joy of science, will not leave it for the rest of his life.
Polanyi's longtime friend Eugene Wigner later said of him, "I doubt he was ever again as happy as he had been in Berlin. Institute for Physical Chemistry, Polanyi described a republic of science with Haber as its chief legislator.70
Crowther had a similar point of view but with a more critical perspective. Crowther was a leftist-leaning journalist who would become a partisan of what came to be called Bernalism and the scientists-for-social-responsibiUty movement in England. There was something about Berlin, he wrote in 1930, that was "a little frightening." "I was left with the impression that the brilliant scientific efflorescence... had an intellectual life of its own, above that of industry and the people, in spite of the inte gration of the scientific research with industry." "This division of the high intellectual life from the brutal rumblings underneath was one of the most striking features of the Weimar Republic."71 For Crowther, scientists and other intellectuals had an obli gation to direct their efforts to the public good, but in Berlin they felt free from this responsibility. In Crowther's view the scientist's vaunted freedom from society and politics was an irresponsible and dangerous flaw in German scientific life, while for Polanyi, this alleged autonomy was a strength to be maintained. In response to the prevailing cliche that scientists do, or should, seek bold breakthroughs, Polanyi cautioned that the quest for novelty and recognition is not an easy one. "The scientist's surmises and hunches," he wrote: "involve high stakes, as hazardous as their prospects are fascinating. The time and money, the prestige and self-confidence gambled away in disappointing guesses will soon exhaust a scientist's courage and standing."86
The scientist is not mechanical and objective in his work; he is not "indiffer ent to the outcome of his surmises." Nor does a scientist leave his thinking cap outside the door when he dons a lab coat. In contrast to Popper's rule of falsifica tion, Polanyi's scientist "risks defeat but never seeks it."87 The scientist is rooted in beliefs about a real world, but also in a craving for success. This is Weber and Haber's world of practice, not Popper or Comte's world of ideas.
Polanyi did not think of himself as revolutionary. He wrote in 1962:88
The example of great scientists [like Einstein] is the light which guides all workers in science, but we must guard against being blinded by it. There has been too much talk about the flash of discovery and this has tended to obscure the fact that discoveries, however great, can only give effect to some intrinsic potentiality of the intellectual situation in which scientists find themselves. It is easier to see this for the kind of work that I have done than it is for major discoveries.
Polanyi recognized that he had failed to win over physical chemists to his theory of adsorption and to interest theoretical physicists in his work on the solid state in the 1920s. Polanyi's insights were less successful with philosophers of science than with policy-makers. Philosophers had difficulty making coherent Polanyi's attempt to define what he called personal knowledge rooted in the scientist's faith that sci ence can establish "contact with a hidden reality."104 For Polanyi, science is not reducible to social relations; scientists are constrained by what is really there in the world. Polanyi related this reality to a God-like presence, and therefore, to something like spiritual faith, unlike Kuhn and Popper, and rather like Einstein and Planck.105 Nonetheless, Polanyi, like Kuhn after him, clearly raised the problem for many people of how objective scientific knowledge can result from the intensely personal and fallible endeavor of creative scientific inquiry.
In describing his own career, Polanyi undervalued his scientific work, but he accurately portrayed the aspirations, misgivings, and frustrations of many of his fellow scientists. In Germany, earlier and more thoroughly than in other coun tries, the scientists who led in their disciplines had to negotiate compromises and accommodations in their everyday work between the demands of their discipline, the university, the state, and industry, on the one hand, and their personal curiosities, passions, preoccupations, and ambitions, on the other. The professional scientific structures in France, Britain, the United States, and other countries all resembled those in pre-Nazi Germany to different degrees by the 1930s. Michael Polanyi is an unusual figure for the authenticity of personal experience and personal witness that he brought to philosophy of science, but he is representative of a generation of scientists who struggled to maintain faith in rationality, collegiality, and progress during difficult times. 
